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In the summer of 1965, a two-month strike in an important seg-
ment of the offshore maritime industry, an industry in which work
stoppages have periodically accompanied the termination of collective
bargaining agreements,' aroused considerable national attention. Pub-
lic interest was enhanced by the fact that the American merchant
marine is the beneficiary of special federal financial support, and any
substantial interruption in its operations has a serious impact on the
national economy.' A stereotype solution commonly urged is further
legislation, usually more restrictive and oppressive for the unions
which are depicted as the sole culprit. Rarely are the shortcomings of
the Government or of management exposed or discussed as a possible
cause for the low state of labor-management relations. The purpose of
this article is to present a specific case history which may serve as a
basis for rational and explicit suggestions, designed to improve what is
admittedly a chaotic situation.
Any industry beset with craft unions is subject to more potential
difficulties than those commonly confronting the parties where a single
industrial form of union prevails. The seagoing personnel of the Amer-
ican offshore merchant marine have been organized almost exclusively
on a craft basis. There are separate and distinct unions for the officers
which exclude the unlicensed personnel; and each such union is con-
fined to a single officer group, i.e., deck, engine room and radio depart-
ments.
The situation is not as clear for the unlicensed. In two instances,
all crew members are represented by a single union, 3
 while in another,
'0 A.B., Cornell University, 1926; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1929; Harvard Law
Review, 1927-1929; Member, New York Bar.
1 Injunctions under the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-58
(1964), have been issued on 5 occasions over the past 9 years to enjoin threatened or
actual strikes in the maritime industry.
2 The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1985, as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (1964), establishes the basis for operating and construction subsidies; other
statutes permit only American flag vessels to operate in domestic trade and guarantee
the use of American flag vessels for a minimum percentage of cargo generated under
foreign aid programs. Hereafter, reference to subsidized companies shall be confined to
those receiving the operating subsidy which reimburses for the difference in wage costs
of the American flag vessel as compared with foreign flag vessels operating in the same
trade routes. In all, there are 15 companies receiving an operating subsidy for approxi-
mately 300 vessels, which amounts to an annual federal payment of $300 million.
3 National Maritime Union and Seafarers Intl Union, Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and
Inland Waters District.
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there are separate unions for the engine, deck and steward operations. 4
Additionally, in certain areas rival unions claim similar jurisdiction,
even though both unions are within the fold of the AFI-CI0. 5
Thus, we have the National Marine Engineers Beneficial Associa-
tion (MEBA), embracing the licensed marine engineers employed on
vessels operating out of the Atlantic, gulf and Pacific coasts. The
Masters, Mates and Pilots (MM&P) and the American Radio Officers
(ARA) cover respectively the licensed deck and radio officers employed
on all three coasts. But the Radio Officers Union (ROU) also claims
jurisdiction over radio officers and has separate contracts on all coasts.
For unlicensed personnel, the National Maritime Union (NMU)
embraces all such crew members employed by companies operating
essentially out of the Atlantic and gulf coasts." Its rival union, the
Seafarers International Union (SIU) 7—Atlantic, Lakes and Inland
Waters District—follows the same pattern with those companies with
which it has collective bargaining agreements. However, on the Pacific
coast, where the SIU has a separate district, there are three distinct
autonomous unions, the Sailors Union of the Pacific (SUP), the Marine
Firemen, Oilers and Watertenders (MFO&W) and the Marine Cooks
and Stewards (MC&S) which respectively represent deck, engine and
steward unlicensed personnel.
The mere enumeration of the unions involved should suffice to
cause industrial relations jitters. But the difficulty is compounded by a
similar, if not a more serious, proliferation on the side of manage-
ment. For the Atlantic and gulf coasts, there is the American Merchant
Marine Institute (AMMI) which is composed primarily of subsidized
dry cargo operators' and tanker companies. The latter group, however,
has its separate organization for labor negotiations known as the Tank-
ers Service Committee. We, also, have the American Maritime Associa-
tion (AMA) which embraces unsubsidized dry cargo companies° and
those tanker companies not identified with the Tankers Service Corn-
4 Sailors Union of the Pacific; Marine Cooks & Stewards; and the Marine Fire-
men, Oilers & Watertenders—all associated with the Seafarers Int'l Union.
5
 National Maritime Union and Seafarers Int'I Union claim jurisdiction over
unlicensed personnel; the MEBA and the Brotherhood of Marine Officers (BMO) claim
jurisdiction over licensed engineers; and the BMO and the Masters, Mates & Pilots claim
jurisdiction over licensed deck officers.
8
 Within the past few years, the NMU issued a charter to a then unaffiliated organiza-
tion, the BMO, whose contracts are confined essentially to two companies covering both
deck and engine officers.
7
 The SIU has an affiliated autonomous union known as the Staff Officers Union,
which has contracts with a few companies on the Atlantic and gulf coasts covering
the pursers, and a separate affiliated union on the Pacific coast which contracts for
similar personnel.
8 Three large and several smaller companies which are members of the AMMI are
not subsidized.
9 One large company, which until recently was a member of AMA, is subsidized.
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mittee. And, of course, there are some dry cargo or tanker companies
not participating in any of the management organizations.
On the west coast, the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) rep-
resents practically all of the dry cargo operators which, with but one
exception, are subsidized. The tanker companies on this coast negotiate
separately.
The contract pattern is both simple and complicated. Each union
customarily has a standard agreement for all of its contracted com-
panies, which may vary only between dry cargo and tanker operations.
But the member companies of any one employer association do not in-
variably have contracts with all the same unions. A specific company
may, for one or more crafts, have agreements with unions rival to those
with which its fellow association members have collective bargaining
contracts."
In 1961 all collective bargaining agreements expired in either
June or September. Strikes occurred on both the east and west coasts
before new contracts were consummated." The objective sought in those
negotiations, and generally achieved with governmental assistance, was
to provide all the unions involved with a comparable economic cost
package. The specific benefits in each of the newly negotiated agree-
ments may have varied with the preference of the individual union, but
the overall cost for each contract was substantially the same. In addi-
tion, the unions, with but three exceptions, agreed upon long-term con-
tracts with a common expiration date of June 15, 1965. The MEBA's
new agreement for all companies on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and
the MM&P's agreement on the west coast were renewed until June 15,
1964. The SIU entered into a one-year agreement for its Atlantic and
gulf coasts operations.
The foregoing pattern was an important achievement for the in-
dustry and augured well for future stability. Previously, management
had complained that the several unions, with varying expiration dates
for their respective agreements, had "rolled" the companies on an ever
10
 On the west coast, PMA, as the single employers' association, negotiates in
behalf of its members with the separate unions covering all the seagoing personnel. There
are no rival unions for the same group of crew members. However, on the Atlantic and
gulf coasts, a member of the AMMI, such as the Moore-McCormack S.S. Co., has contracts
with the NMU for one portion of its operation and the SIU for another segment, while
practically all the remaining members of AMMI deal exclusively with the NMU. On the
other hand, practically all the members of the AMA deal exclusively with the SIU, but
a few members have contracts with the NMU. To add to the complexity, it should be
noted that while all but two members of the AMMI contract with the MEBA and
MUST, those two companies have agreements with the BMO; and at least one large
member company does not have any agreement with ARA.
11 These were the subject of two of the Taft-Hartley injunctions, supra note' 1. See
Seafarers Int'l Union v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 304 F.2d 437 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 924 (1962) ; United States v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d
385 (2d Cir. 1961).
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escalating process. But the comparable cost packages established for
the 1961 round of negotiations combined with a common expiration
date for a long-term agreement provided a firm basis for a mature
pattern of labor relations.
II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE 1965 NEGOTIATIONS
Soon after completion of the 1961 negotiations, which had deeply
involved the federal government, the initiation of a comprehensive
study was announced, to be conducted under the auspices of Professor
James Healy of the Harvard Business School." The purpose was to
study the many labor-management problems confronting the mari-
time industry. While it is known that a staff of researchers commenced
work and interviewed many officials prominent in the industry, and
a comprehensive, impartial study by them could have been of immeasur-
able assistance in the 1965 negotiations, no public report has been
forthcoming.
During 1962-1963, a few small dark clouds appeared which
promised, unless dissipated, to eventually engulf the parties with hurri-
cane force. Under its 1961 agreement, the MEBA had chosen the path
of a highly improved pension program, into which it placed a major
portion of the available cost package. Thus, as of •962, there was
established for MEBA's members a pension benefit of $200 per month
for twenty years of service, regardless of age. Pensions covered under
the other union collective bargaining agreements ranged from $100
per month for unlicensed seamen to $150 for licensed officers; all were
based on twenty years of service with retirement between sixty and
sixty-five years of age. The other unions had generally used their re-
spective cost packages for diverse benefits, including general wage
increases.
In 1963 the subsidized companies were preparing their designs
for the construction of automated or retrofit vessels as part of their
ship replacement program. The Maritime Administration, which super-
vises the construction subsidy for such new vessels, insisted that the
companies obtain agreement from the affected unions for a decreased
manning scale" as a precondition to subsidy approval. The companies
accordingly initiated discussions with the MEBA. The union responded
with a program which was accepted by all the companies under contract
12 N.V. Times, Aug. 18, 1962, p. 42, col. 6.
13
 In the case of the subsidized companies, if there is a decrease in the manning level,
the savings in large measure accrue to the federal government rather than to the individual
companies. However, the collective bargaining is confined to the companies and the
respective unions, with no direct participation by the Government other than its
economic power to disallow subsidy for any manning which it believes to be excessive.
As frequently stated, the unions find themselves in negotiations over which Hamlet
exercises a veto power but Hamlet is ever absent.
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on the Atlantic and west coasts. The agreements, which were due to
expire June 1964, would be extended to June 1965 in common with the
other maritime unions. The pension would be increased to $300 per
month, and a tentative and lower manning scale for engineers on the
automated vessels was approved subject to certain conditions: First,
after the new vessels were in operation, a factfinding survey would be
made by an impartial firm to determine whether the new automated ma-
chinery increased the normal work load for the lesser number of en-
gineers; second, the prevailing jurisdiction of the engineers would be
observed; and third, any disputes between the parties would be subject
to the contract's arbitration machinery. A pattern was thereby estab-
lished which, if followed in the case of the other unions, would have
provided a fair method to determine the proper manning for the new
style vessels.
Unfortunately, this did not occur. Discussions which followed be-
tween the NMU and the companies broadened into negotiations for a
new agreement which would expire in 1969. New benefits were granted
which were estimated as being equal to fifteen to sixteen per cent of
base wages, with periodic wage reviews available, predicated essentially
on what other maritime unions might obtain for the period succeeding
June 1965. Such a protective clause, initially introduced in this agree-
ment, has come to be known in the industry as the "Me Too" provision.
In addition, there was provision for an automation fund into which
each company would contribute a fixed sum per day for covered per-
sonnel. The companies, however, obtained no specific protection relat-
ing to manning on the automated vessels. Instead, it was agreed that
the manning scale for any such new vessel, as in the case of standard
vessels, must be mutually agreed upon before the ship is commissioned
for operation. Separately, and only on a tentative basis, the NMU
approved a decreased manning scale for the initial automated and
retrofit vessels to operate; but in face of the contract provision, such
tentative approval could be withdrawn unilaterally and the companies
could invoke no binding arbitration procedure:"
Concurrently, the MM&P refused to enter into any agreement
covering manning on the automated vessels but, rather, insisted upon
the same scale as prevailed on the conventional ships. The differences
in treatment which thus emerged forbode severe difficulties for the
industry.
The second timebomb which was set to ticking in 1964 involved
MM&P's contract on the west coast, which was due to expire on June
14 In spite of the severe shortcoming of the agreement, it was hailed by the president
of the AMMI as marking a milestone for the maritime industry: It ". . is geared
throughout to meet the impact of automation and mechanization on American Flag ship-
ping and on seagoing maritime labor." N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1963, p. 46, col. I.
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15. As indicated, this union had utilized its cost package available
under its 1961 agreement for diverse benefits, including wage increases.
The PMA executed a one-year extension with MM&P to continue until
June 15, 1965, pursuant to which the latter union received all of the
benefits for which MEBA had used its 1961 cost package, including
specifically the service pension. It was apparent to all in the industry
that PMA had sparked off a new era of spiralling which would plague
the forthcoming 1965 negotiations. By such a single extension and the
inequity created against all the other maritime unions, the PMA had
undone all that had been accomplished after agonizing negotiations
and bitter strikes in 1961.
During 1964 several of the companies activated their first retrofit
and automated vessels. Under its agreement with one such company,'
MEBA invoked the service of the impartial factfinding agency to con-
duct its survey aboard the new retrofit vessel within the guideposts
agreed upon between the union and the company. The report which
followed found that the automated engine room machinery, did not de-
crease the work load of the engineers. The MESA thereupon requested
the company to add two more engineers to meet the required standard
manning scale. Agreement was reached on a tentative basis for the
addition of one more engineer. Forthwith, the NMU refused to man
the vessel unless its manning scale was increased but refused to utilize
the services of any factfinding agency. Brought before the arbitrator,
an award was issued directing the union to discontinue the stoppage,
and recommending that two more unlicensed persons be temporarily
added to the manning scale pending the completion of a factfinding
survey. The union refused to comply, and a court declined to issue an
injunction enforcing the award. The sole basis for NMU's demand
was that the number of engineers had been increased; it was not
predicated on need nor was any other justification urged.
Previously, for the initial voyage of the same vessel, the MM&P
insisted on its standard scale before sailing. An arbitrator directed
MM&P to terminate its stoppage, which award was confirmed by
court order.
At this point, the company, with the knowledge and apparent
consent of the Maritime Administration, complied with NMU's in-
sistence that its crew number be increased by three and also, though
not required to do so, added to the manning for MM&P. The vessel
sailed. Thereupon MEBA requested arbitration to obtain its standard
manning as justified under the factfinding survey conducted on the
vessel. The arbitrator upheld its claim. Under these conditions, if
vessel automation depended on agreement with all the unions for
reduced manning scales, the future appeared to be most bleak.
15
 Gulf & So. Am. S.S. Co.
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III. THE NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE STRIKE
The situation confronting the industry was not comforting. On the
west coast, because of PMA's 1964 contract with the MM&P, a
glaring inequity had been created against the other unions. For the
1965 agreement, it could thus be anticipated that the cost package to
be sought by these unions would include an additional amount to
eliminate the inequity. But it could equally be expected that the
MM&P would not accept any 1965 cost package of lesser amount
than that accorded the other maritime unions. This impossible
situation, created by PMA, made it difficult to foresee a peaceful settle-
ment on the west coast. The Atlantic and gulf coasts did not appear to
present any comparable problem.
A number of meetings were held between representatives of the
PMA, the AMMI and the Tanker Service Committee at which the
west coast ship operators actively urged a policy of joint and unified
collective bargaining. This proposal was firmly rejected by the AMMI,
which felt that the west coast companies could not avoid a strike, and
they did not wish to be caught in the same web.
Several months prior to the June 15, 1965 termination date,
MEBA, aware of the differences among the shipowners and their
failure to agree upon any joint action, approached the subsidized com-
panies on the Atlantic and gulf coasts. In an effort to provide a basis
for settlement of all the contracts shortly due to expire, a proposal was
made which included: (a) A four-year contract to terminate June
1969; (b) a cost package equal in amount to that given to the NMU,
effective June 1965; (c) wage reviews during the term of the new
agreement based in part on the "Me Too" protection; and (d) a
continuation of the previous agreement made with MEBA covering
manning on the automated and retrofit vessels.
This concrete proposal was rejected. Negotiations were there-
after conducted on a most desultory basis so that by June 1, the com-
panies may have met with each of the unions two or three times at
best with practically no effective or meaningful discussion.
The SIU for the Atlantic and gulf coasts, and its Pacific Coast
District for the west coast, offered a sixty-day extension to their
contracted companies. This was accepted. The other unions on the
west coast, though not extending their respective contracts, had not
taken any strike action by June 15.
Thus, the center of attraction moved toward the MEBA, MM&P
and the ARA on the Atlantic and gulf coasts. The companies were
broken down into essentially three groups: eight subsidized companies
which were the core of AMMI, all other dry cargo companies and
the tanker operators.
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The MESA had no insoluble problems with either the tankers or
the non-subsidized dry cargo companies. Prior to June 15, a new four-
year agreement was reached with all of these operators providing a
cost package equal to 3.2% of total employment costs for each of
the four years, the allocation of which was subject to the discretion of
the union. While such settlement was within the guidelines of the
national wage-price policy, it did result in a substantial increase since
total employment costs include, in addition to base wages, all fringe
benefits and overtime which, as one factor in the maritime industry,
amounts to fifty per cent of the base pay. The 3.2% of total employ-
ment costs equalled six to seven per cent of base wages." An essential
ingredient of this settlement was that if any other maritime union
received a greater economic cost package, the difference would be
extended to MEBA.
These two group of companies, however, faced a more difficult
problem with the MM&P and the ARA, with whom new contracts
had to be completed to avoid a strike on June 15. Essentially the issue
was this: In past years, MEBA had, through negotiation on contract
termination, or during the administration of past contracts, obtained
benefits not yet enjoyed by these two unions. They declared their
determination to eliminate such inequities as well as receive a package
comparable to the 3.2% of employment costs granted MEBA. But if
the companies were to yield, they would be faced with the subsequent
claim of MEBA under the "Me Too" provision.
The non-subsidized dry cargo companies reached agreement with
MM&P and the ARA prior to June 15, granting these unions
practically all of their demands." The vessels of these companies were
not affected by any stoppage, but they are subject to a pending claim
by MEBA, not yet submitted, for additional benefits. This is com-
plicated further by the fact that the MM&P and ARA contracts
contain a "Me Too" clause which in turn could lead to endless
spiralling. Another factor is that these companies obtained a "Me Too"
clause of their own, so that if the two unions failed to obtain all the
benefits granted from the eight subsidized companies, each of the
companies would be accorded similar treatment.
The tanker companies reached an agreement with the ARA, but
were struck by the MM&P. After a brief stoppage, settlement was
reached. Essentially, these companies contend that they did not breach
16 Thus, over the 4-year period of the contract, the total increase would be 24% to
28% of base wages while the proposal submitted by MEBA in the spring of the year and
rejected by the companies only amounted to 15% to 16% of base wages.
17 Several companies, both subsidized and unsubsidized, which were members of the
AMMI, kit its fold and signed these contracts with the MM&P and ARA.
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the 3.2% cost package, but instead granted increased manning to the
MM&P.
The strike, which started on June 16 and lasted over two months,
involved the MEBA, MM&P and the ARA. It was directed essentially
at the eight subsidized companies operating on the Atlantic and gulf
coasts. Contrary to all previous expectations, the west coast operators
were not confronted with any stoppage, but continued their collective
bargaining.
As compared with approximately 720 vessels operating under
renewed or extended contracts," the eight companies controlled about
180 vessels. Of this number, over half were unaffected by the extended
strike, since they were either on extended voyages or engaged in
transporting military cargo and, by agreement with the unions, were
continued in uninterrupted service. The significant question is how
these eight subsidized companies, as distinguished from all the other
segments of the maritime industry, had become entrapped in a strike.
IV. THE STRIKE, THE ISSUES AND THE SETTLEMENT
The basic money package was not in issue immediately preceding
nor during the strike. There was agreement on the 3.2% of employment
costs for each year during the term of any new agreement. However,
in the MEBA negotiations, which occupied the concentrated attention
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, an unexpected
stumbling block emerged because of conflicting views of different
government agencies.
As previously indicated, MEBA had concentrated upon a pension
program in its 1961 agreement. One of its 1965 demands was further
improvement of the pension benefits with the accompanying under-
standing that whatever cost was involved would come out of any cost
package agreed upon. Further, MEBA demanded that the union have
the right to determine the specific benefits to which the remaining
available cost package would be applied. This program presented no
problem to the companies and it met with the approval of the federal
mediation panel. At a crucial stage in the negotiations, Secretary of
Commerce John T. Connor, as a guest speaker on a national television
program," remarked that the pension program requested by MEBA,
though to be financed within the national wage-price policy, would
nevertheless have an inflationary impact. It is, of course, a rather novel
concept that a money package agreed upon in collective bargaining
would have inflationary aspects if applied to pensions but not if put
18 This would include all vessels, dry cargo and tankers, operating on all coasts
under contracts with the AFL-CIO unions or the few independent unions.
10
 "Meet the Press," July 18, 1965.
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into immediate wage increases.' This position buttressed a decision
of the Maritime Subsidy Board, issued during the 1965 negotiations
although pertaining to a 1963 agreement between certain subsidized
companies and MEBA, which cast doubt on the approval of future
subsidies for additional contributions to the MEBA pension plan.'
Negotiations between the parties came to a grinding halt. The
eight subsidized companies took the position that any increase in their
labor costs coming as a result of negotiations with the union must be
reimbursed by subsidy; and, if this be in question, there could be no
fruitful negotiations or agreement. The Maritime Administration con-
tended that the companies as private entrepreneurs were free to
negotiate and bargain; the Government merely exercised the sub-
sequent right to approve or disapprove for subsidy certain items of
wage cost. But this Alice in Wonderland did not enhance the posture
of the negotiations. It was only after the intervention of another cabinet
officer' that agreement was reached on the issue. The union, by con-
tract, was empowered to allocate the available money package, in-
cluding improvement in the pension plan, and the companies received
assurance that their subsidy would not be challenged.'
The second knotty problem involved manning on the automated
vessels. On the eve of the strike, the companies indicated their
dissatisfaction with and their desire to terminate their 1963 agreement
with MEBA on this subject. That agreement had provided for a
tentative manning scale with appropriate safeguards to protect
jurisdiction, preclude increase in work loads and to provide for fact-
finding and binding arbitration in the event of a dispute. The objection
was that, although this approach was rational and fair, the employers'
experience with the NMU and the MM&P, as previously described,
made it impossible to accept arbitration with MEBA since this could
result in upward revisions in manning for the engineers. Thus, the
companies insisted that what had been agreed to as tentative manning
on the automated vessels must be frozen for the duration of any new
agreement.
MEBA offered alternative proposals: first, to negotiate a final and
binding manning scale for automated vessels—it maintained that a
method agreed to on a tentative basis, which had been shown through
the factfinding surveys to be inadequate, should not be fixed as
20 The National War Labor Board and the Wage Stabilization Board, during World
War II and the early post-war years, emphasized the need of casting all new benefits into
pensions and fringe issues rather than wages to avoid inflation.
21 Collective Bargaining Agreement—MEBA, No. A-14, Maritime Subsidy Bd.,
July 13, 1965.
22 Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz.
23 Statement by Secretary of Commerce John Connor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1965,
p. 54, col. 1.
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permanent simply because other unions so insisted; or, second, to
continue the tentative manning with a clear provision that all manning
on the automated vessels was subject to future mutual consent. Failing
agreement, there could be no arbitration. The companies conceded that
such a provision was in the NMU contract but they refused to accord
equal protection to MEBA.
The Secretary of Labor, after a series of discussions with the
parties, held jointly and separately, submitted a proposal on this
thorny issue in an effort to settle the strike:' MEBA accepted; the
companies rejected. The solution offered was that the manning
tentatively agreed upon on the automated vessels which were in opera-
tion at the initiation of the strike be continued for a period of six
months. During that period, the Secretary of Labor and the president
of the AFL-CIO would endeavor to obtain agreement among all the
affected maritime unions on procedures to determine disputes relating
to manning.
The impasse was broken through the intervention of the President
of the United States, who requested the parties to accept the program
advanced by the Secretary of Labor. He also offered to assist the joint
efforts of the Secretary of Labor and President Meany of the AFL-
CIO." The eight subsidized companies accepted the program. Agree-
ment quickly followed, and the contract with MEBA was executed.
The Department of Labor's attention then turned to the disputes
between the same eight subsidized companies and the MM&P and
ARA. It had been anticipated that the pattern evolved with MEBA
would swiftly dispose of these two remaining contracts, but the strike
continued for several more weeks before settlement was reached. The
core of the problem confronting the parties was this: In their contracts
with the other dry cargo companies, MM&P and ARA had obtained
economic concessions beyond the cost package fixed by the 3.2% guide-
line to meet the so-called inequities vis-a-vis the MEBA.
The eight subsidized companies refused to follow suit for two
reasons: First, under the "Me Too" clause contained in their contract
with MEBA, any such concession to MM&P and ARA combined with
a "Me Too" clause to the two latter unions would result in a deadly
endless escalation; second, any economic package in excess of the 3.2%
limit would probably be disapproved by the Maritime Subsidy Board.
The settlement which emerged was the product of long, exhausting
hours of negotiations and the driving insistence of representatives of
the Labor Department that a conclusion must be reached in the face
of the President's mounting displeasure with the continuing strike.
24 Statement by Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1965,
p. 78, col. 5.
25
 Statement by President Johnson, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1965, p. 1, col. 3.
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Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand why the
completed contracts with the MM&P and ARA, though terminating
the strike, have only created more tormenting problems for the
industry.
First, while the 3.2% guideline is set forth as the limitation, the
agreement incorporates certain additional benefits which obviously will
increase the total cost package. This result would automatically
invoke the "Me Too" clause under the MEBA contract. In an effort
to avoid this, the Secretary of Labor gave the parties a written inter-
pretation advising them that MEBA, under its agreement, could not
so utilize the "Me Too" protective provision to obtain equal additional
benefits. Such intervention by the Secretary of Labor into a contract
under which he is not the arbitrator, and especially in the absence of
any participation by MEBA, raises a serious question as to the con-
tinuing validity of its agreement with the eight companies.
Second, the essence of the agreement reached between MEBA and
the eight companies on manning for automated vessels was the
anticipated consent of all maritime unions to procedures for deter-
mining manning disputes. As indicated,' the NMU for the unlicensed
and MEBA for the licensed officers had tentatively accepted a reduced
manning. But in the final agreement with MM&P, which was com-
pleted under the direct auspices of the Secretary of Labor, all manning
was frozen so that automated ships would have the standard manning
applicable to conventional vessels for the full term of the agreement.
This bodes ill for any attempt to procure the consent of other unions
for any program which could affect them only adversely with no cor-
responding participation by the MM&P for the deck officers.
Third, a provision was incorporated in the MEBA contract which
admittedly merely confirmed a pre-existing practice permitting each
engineer, upon the completion of a voyage and while the vessel was in
port, to obtain one day off without loss of pay. Such a provision, not
being a new benefit, its cost, if any, was not allocated against the new
3.2% package. In the course of the ARA negotiations, however, one
of the Labor Department mediators supervising the sessions held that
such provision in the MEBA contract did establish an increased cost
and thereby the ARA was entitled to some comparable benefit. Follow-
ing this ruling, a subsequent arbitration award granted ARA an im-
provement in its vacation program. This immediately permits both
MEBA and the MM&P to require comparable increases in their
respective vacation benefits, a most costly item, and, in the industry's
mournful expectation, would not be approved for subsidy purposes since
it is beyond the 3.2% guidepost.
26 See p. 809 supra.
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In comparison with the harrowing experience of the eight sub-
sidized companies on the Atlantic and gulf coasts, the subsidized
industry on the west coast encountered no stoppage of work. The
MM&P executed a contract for four years, which fell within the
3.2% guidepost, but provided benefits below what its counterpart
obtained on the Atlantic and gulf coasts. MEBA's contract assures
precisely the same benefits as were secured from all the companies
on the Atlantic and gulf coasts, thereby completing a national contract
for at least one of the affected maritime unions. In addition, the PMA
agreed that on any automated vessel to be commissioned, there can be
no reduction in manning unless the union agrees, and no dispute on
this issue may be submitted to arbitration.
The three unions on the west coast embracing the unlicensed
personnel, i.e., SUP, MFO&W and M.C.&S., affiliated with the SIU,
have not, as of this writing, completed their new agreement. It is known
that tentative agreement has been reached on substantial improvement
in the pension program. For manning on automated vessels, these unions
have apparently reached agreement with the PMA that no changes can
be effected in the absence of mutual consent, and arbitration on any
disputed issue is expressly precluded; in addition, where reductions are
agreed upon, the company will contribute at least half of the wages of
the personnel so decreased into a fund. To complete the picture, the
SIU for the Atlantic and gulf coasts quietly negotiated to a conclusion
its renewed contracts with the companies involved for a three-year
term to expire in 1968.
An additional discouraging donnybrook apparently awaits AMMI's
eight subsidized companies in 1966. The agreement which they
executed with NMU in 1963 provided for new benefits effective as of
June 1965, amounting to approximately fifteen to sixteen per cent of
base wages. The Maritime Subsidy Board has already issued an
opinion" relative to this agreement; that such an increase in wage costs
would be approved for subsidy since, when averaged over the four-year
term of the contract, it does not exceed 3.2% of total employment costs
for each year; but any additional benefits granted during the period
would pierce the ceiling and probably be disapproved. However, the
eight companies are aware that, in the face of the new contracts com-
pleted with the other unions, particularly those on the west coast, the
NMU must and will exercise its available wage review in 1966. If any
relief is granted, the "Me Too" clauses in the other union agreements
would be automatically activated.
It is difficult to see how any new legislation could possibly have
27 Collective Bargaining Agreement—NMU, No. A-15, Maritime Subsidy Ed., July
13, 1965.
817
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
coped with or eased the manifold problems which emerged during
the course of these negotiations. All parties involved were in agree-
ment that a Taft-Hartley injunction would not have served any
useful purpose, and the federal government refrained from seeking any.
The basic question is whether, in the face of the chaotic situation which
clearly exists, do not labor and management have a compelling duty
to address themselves to the elementary issue at stake, namely the
preservation of the industry, in order to devise the necessary voluntary
measures to meet their needs?
V. CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR THE INDUSTRY
In the field of private enterprise, no better substitute has yet been
devised for the development of sound labor relations than collective
bargaining. This, of course, is the foundation of our national labor
policy" and has been fully supported by judicial decisions." Most
expert opinion frowns upon compulsory arbitration as a solution for
industrial disputes since it would tend to weaken, if not fully negate,
the process of direct collective bargaining."
Clearly, none of the traditional legislation usually urged for the
elimination of strikes would have served any useful purpose in the
recent maritime dispute. Federal mediation was fully utilized. If com-
pulsory arbitration had been the known end result, there would have
been no collective bargaining or any durable resolution of the basic
problems besetting the industry."
It is significant that all the unsubsidized dry cargo operators and
the tankers did complete their agreements with at most a brief stop-
page. This group even included several companies which, although
originally identified with the AMMI, quickly determined not to
become embroiled. 32
 Equally important is the fact that one large
subsidized operator on the gulf coast perfected an agreement, and
the west coast shipowners, while mostly subsidized, continued to
engage in fruitful negotiations and are near agreement without any
interruption of operations. Thus, while one or more of the participating
unions may have contributed to an unnecessary strike with the eight
28 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1964).
29 Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
30 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, The Pros and Cons of Compulsory Arbitra-
tion (1965).
31 On August 28, 1963, the President of the United States signed the first national
act imposing compulsory arbitration upon the railroad industry. 77 Stat. 132 (1963), 45
U.S.C. 157 (1964). But in 1966 the railroad unions are threatening a national tie-up upon
the termination date of said law since the arbitration process completely failed to meet the
problem involved.
32 Bethlehem Steel, Marine Transp. and Alcoa S.S.
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subsidized companies, the latter group through their ineptness and
the conflicting policies of the intervening federal agencies must share
the responsibility.
One vital problem which demands solution relates to the federal
subsidy and its impact in the arena of labor relations. Under such
subsidy program, all increases in wage costs embodied in new labor
agreements, if approved for subsidy by the Maritime Administration,
will be paid by the United States Government. The eight subsidized
companies caught in the strike have become imbued with the concept
that all increases in wage costs negotiated with the unions must be so
subsidized, and no part of such costs should be borne as operating ex-
penses and charged against operating profits." In fact this has been
the practice for many years. Of recent date, however, the Maritime
Administration repeatedly asserted that it will not give a prior blank
check and will insist upon the right to review any collective bargaining
agreement to determine whether, at a subsequent date, the agreed upon
increased wage costs are fair and reasonable and thus reimbursable
through the subsidy. But at the same time, the Maritime Administra-
tion declined to participate in the labor negotiations assuming instead
that the parties would agree. As an alternative, it issued directives,
in the case of manning and pension plans, as to what the proper
standards should be, thereby binding the hands of the operators who
felt they were left with no discretion in the bargaining arena. Ac-
cordingly, these subsidized companies seized the earliest opportunity
to demand government intervention to arbitrate the dispute on the
assumption that the subsidy for increased costs so determined could
not be withheld in the face of the arbitration award.
Obviously, in such a state of affairs the companies and the unions
could not engage in any rational collective bargaining; their failure to
come to agreement is no reflection on the process itself. But equally so,
the injection of compulsory arbitration would be merely a coverup
for a clear abdication of managerial responsibility. A solution has been
offered. The basis of the subsidy program must be revised, leaving the
operators free to conduct their business as any other private enterprise
and subject to the same free play of economic forces." Only in this
33 One subsidized company on the gulf coast, the Delta S.S. Co., harbored no such
frozen concept and completed the standard contracts without any strike. Similarly, on
the west coast, the subsidized companies have negotiated with complete freedom of action
and have apparently avoided any needless stoppage.
34 Task Force report prepared by representatives of several federal departments
for submission to the President's Advisory Committee on Maritime which, in part,
proposes to revise the basis on which operating subsidies would be computed so as
to enhance company incentive and ingenuity and to eliminate any automatic payment
by the Government of increases in wage costs negotiated in collective bargaining. See
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, The Merchant Marine in National Defense and Trade, A
Policy and a Program, The Inter Agency Maritime Task Force (1965).
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manner would collective bargaining as a process receive a fair test and
the anachronistic intervention by the Government, as displayed in the
recent negotiations, be eliminated.
Further, experience has shown the imperative need for joint and
cooperative action within the respective ranks of management and
labor. Management in the maritime industry can ill afford to point
to the many unions with which they must negotiate while their own
house remains as disunited as it is. Comparable responsibility must be
exercised by the labor unions. While the disparate economic needs of
diverse types of operations among the companies may justify separate
trade associations, such need is certainly not present within the area
of labor relations. On the labor side, however, there are historical
reasons unique to maritime operations explaining why craft unions
have developed in this industry; these cannot be airily waved aside. But
cooperative action does not necessarily require mergers or consolida-
tion. In the closely-knit maritime industry, where the same economic
pattern for all unions would not create hardship or injustice as long
as each union could determine for itself the specific benefits desired
by its membership, joint action among the unions should be the ob-
jective. Such pattern would inevitably encourage long-term agreements
with common expiration dates and identity of treatment for the same
problem thereby discouraging any management effort to play favorites.
Further, it would tend to eliminate any "whipsawing" or "rolling"
with its accompanying endless escalation.
If this be accomplished, a basis will have been laid for greater
mutual understanding. Only within such a framework could there be
fruitful effort to obtain voluntary agreement upon procedures for final
and peaceful determination of inter-union and labor-management dis-
putes concerning disturbing problems such as manning on automated
vessels and related issues. A dual recognition by management and labor
of their respective obligations, and concrete action taken in fulfillment,
should result in giant steps toward a more stable and matured rela-
tionship among the parties. Such an approach would be more mean-
ingful for the avoidance of needless and repetitive strikes than
legislation engendered in anger to be wielded as a blunderbuss.
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